In a remarkable series of papers, Haugeland lays out what is both a striking interpretation of Heidegger and a compelling account of objectivity and truth. Central to his account is a notion of existential commitment: a commitment to insist that one's understanding of the world succeed in making sense of the phenomena and so potentially to change or give up on that understanding in the face of apparently impossible phenomena. Although Haugeland never gives a clear account of existential commitment, he claims that it is fundamentally an individual matter. is, I argue, is a mistake that fails to make sense of the public, shared nature of the objective world. Instead, I o er an account of existential commitment as one we undertake jointly, and I analyze it (and the corresponding responsibility) in terms of interpersonal rational patterns of reactive attitudes: emotions like resentment, gratitude, indignation, approbation, guilt, and trust. e upshot is that our existential commitment is not only to a shared, objective world but also to each other such that our ability individually to take responsibility for our understanding of the world is intelligible only in terms of others' being able to hold us responsible for it.
HAUGELAND'S BEHOLDENNESS THEORY OF TRUTH
My dissertation, which John directed, was on the nature of animal thought. I argued that we need to make a distinction between mere goal-directedness, of a sort illuminated by Dennett's intentional systems theory, and genuine desire. For genuine desires involve our nding its object worth pursuing; consequently, mere intentional systems, which exhibit merely a kind of informationally mediated goal-directedness, therefore fall short of robust agency. I presented an account of the sort of worth that is possible for animals-an account of what it is for an animal to care about something-in terms of projectible, rational patterns of emotions. By appealing to the emotions, I was able to articulate a distinctive kind of rationality that was simply not in view in Dennett's appeal to instrumental and epistemic rationality, thereby enriching our understanding of the mind. At my dissertation defense, John asked only one question, which I remember clearly: "OK, " he said, "so you've shown that desire is richer than goal-directedness in terms of an appeal to caring and the emotions. What about belief? How is belief richer than a mere informational state?" It was clear to me then that John was thinking of Heidegger and the place of care in Dasein's disclosedness of the world, a topic that was central to his own thought at the time. I, of course, had little to say in response.
Nonetheless, John's question has haunted me ever since, even as my own research took a turn towards moral psychology and apparently away from John's central concerns. us, I went on to distinguish persons from animals in part in terms of our capacity to value things as a part of the sort of life worth our living, and subsequently embedded this within a broader account of our capacity to love both ourselves and others, thereby arguing that persons are essentially social animals. More recently I have focused on the nature of responsibility, respect, and dignity, as I set my sights on laying the groundwork for an account of metaethics.
roughout, I have tried to articulate an account of the sort of practical rationality central to our understanding of what it is to be a person, an account in which emotions play a central role. Yet we persons are not simply practical creatures; we are theoretical creatures as well. And so I nd myself continually being brought back to John's question and ultimately to his incisive work on objectivity and truth and their relation to our understanding. I now think that the account of emotions and of several varieties of caring that I have been developing is directly relevant to this work of John's and can help us ll in some of the missing pieces in his account of ontical and ontological responsibility for truth. A er all, if in perceiving and understanding the world we are doing something for which we can be responsible, then perhaps the practical and theoretical sides of rationality and of persons aren't as distinct as they might initially have seemed. is is the project I aim to sketch here.
Haugeland's Beholdenness eory of Truth
In a remarkable series of papers, Haugeland lays out what is both a striking interpretation of Heidegger and a compelling account of objectivity and truth. Not being a Heidegger scholar, I'll leave interpretive questions to others; my focus will be on the account of objective truth, which I shall attribute to Haugeland rather than Heidegger.
Haugeland argues that the objectivity of entities in the world can be made intelligible through what he calls the beholdenness theory of truth.
e basic idea is that something is objective-is an entity-just in case it is independent of and criterial for our perceptions of it; thus, objective phenomenon must be accessible (potentially something to which we can be responsive, perhaps with the aid of some equipment), authoritative (that in terms of which our perceptions are understood to be correct or incorrect), and autonomous (independent both of particular perceptions and group consensus). Objects that are autonomous and both accessible to and authoritative for our perceptions, Haugeland claims, are that to which our perceptions are beholden in a way that makes intelligible both the objectivity of the objects as something we might come genuinely to discover and the potential truth of our perceptions.
e task, then, is to esh this out. Following Heidegger, one of Haugeland's central claims is that the discovery of objectsand so their being accessible, authoritative, and autonomous-is possible only together with a disclosure of their being. e basic idea is this:
e being of entities is that in terms of which they are intelligible as entities. e quali er "as entities" (as I am using it) is short for this: with regard to the fact that they are (at all) and with regard to what they are. Understanding an entity as an entity-and there is no other way of understanding it-means understanding it in its that-it-is and its what-it-is. Disclosing the being of entities amounts to letting them become accessible in this two-fold intelligibility-that is, as phenomena that are understood. When taken with su cient generality, a pretty good colloquial paraphrase for "disclosing the being of " is making sense of.
For example, the rules of chess, including not just the rules governing how pieces can be moved, but also rules governing the perceptions and actions of players, are what make chess phenomena (from pieces like rooks to moves like castling to statuses like being in check) intelligible as such; the being of particular chess phenomena, therefore, is their place within such a system of constitutive rules or norms. Likewise, the norms of physics, including not just the laws of nature but also the norms governing the perceptions and actions of physicists, are what make physical phenomena intelligible as physical; the being of particular physical phenomena, therefore, is their place within such a system of constitutive norms. e puzzle, of course, is to see how we can have a role in disclosing the being of some domain of phenomena and thereby constituting those phenomena as the phenomena they are while still being able to make sense of those phenomena as accessible, authoritative, and autonomous-as objective.
Haugeland's solution to this puzzle appeals to a distinction between ontical and ontological understanding. ntical understanding is our ability to identify and cope appropriately with phenomena as the phenomena they in fact are, in light of the relevant background norms of a particular domain. us, in chess our ontical understanding allows us to recognize and respond to knight forks, undefended bishops, opportunities for en passant, etc. By contrast, ontological understanding is our mastery of what's possible or impossible for phenomena-of their intelligibility-again in light of those constitutive norms, a mastery in which it matters to us that the phenomena we discover not be impossible. is makes intelligible what Haugeland calls the "excluded zone": phenomena we might purport to recognize that nonetheless are ruled out as impossible, such as rooks moving diagonally (or neutrinos moving faster than the speed of light). Moreover, our ontical understanding of chess pieces (or neutrinos) depends on our ontological understanding of the total set of norms constituting the domain of chess (or physics), norms that in part govern us as "players" in that domain-as chess players (or physicists). So an ontical understanding of entities depends on an ontological (and ontical) understanding of ourselves as "players" and so of what is possible or impossible for us (what we can and cannot do) and not simply for entities. Once again, such an ontological understanding involves its mattering to each of us that we not act in violation of the norms-in ways that are unacceptable; to do so, Haugeland claims, would be irresponsible.
is provides a preliminary sense in which entities are accessible and authoritative. For entities will be accessible insofar as the norms constituting them as such are interwoven with norms governing our responsiveness to those very entities. And entities are authoritative insofar as our responsibility to ourselves is, because of the excluded zone, also a responsibility to the entities we purport to discover. A er all, a chess player who is indi erent to a rook apparently moving diagonally or a physicist who is indi erent to a neutrino apparently moving faster than the speed of light is being irresponsible, for these apparent phenomena belong to the excluded zone. So responsibility for oneself as a "player" is also responsibility for the truth of the phenomena one discovers; or, to put the same point another way, in being responsible for truth, we are thereby bound to entities as authoritative over our perceptions.
Of course this is not yet good enough for a robust notion of objectivity, for what is missing so far is the autonomy of these entities: their independence not merely of particular perceptions of ours (that's what the authority already discussed provides) but also their independence of mere consensus: the mere fact that the overwhelming majority of physicists think nothing can move faster than the speed of light doesn't make it so. So far the norms constituting the being of entities (and ourselves as players) may seem to be arbitrary because of the possibility . Haugeland, following Heidegger, distinguishes understanding ( erstehen), telling ( ede), and "so ndingness" ( e ndlichkeit), all of which come in ontical and ontological varieties. (See Haugeland, "Truth and Finitude, " §II.) I am essentially compressing this distinction into a single notion of understanding for simplicity of exposition. As will perhaps become clear below, I think Haugeland fails properly to make sense of the place "so ndingness" has in disclosing entities as objective, but I do not have space to discuss this in any detail.
. Ibid., .
that they fabricate a ctional world that is disconnected from reality. What is needed for the autonomy of entities is that particular norms, and indeed the whole system of norms itself, be answerable to the entities themselves. Haugeland's primary example of this is in science: when a scientist nds an apparent phenomenon that seems to violate a law of nature, such as neutrinos traveling faster than the speed of light, her rst response to such a nding in the excluded zone is to reject it and so search for an alternative explanation for why things appeared that way. Yet in the face of apparent phenomena in the excluded zone that cannot be explained away, she must confront the possibility of giving up (and revising) the laws or other norms of science, potentially in revolutionary ways, thereby changing her ontological understanding so as to resolve the apparent impossibility of the manifest phenomena and thereby make their discovery possible. ( is same need to confront the possibility of revising the norms is present in other domains as well: as Haugeland says, chess would not be a playable game if the pieces moved around on their own accord and not under control of the players; and baseball would be unplayable if the pitcher had to make the ball "hang" for a moment over home plate before proceeding on to the catcher. e inertness of chess pieces and the behavior of baseballs is part of the "empirical content" of chess and baseball to which the norms must be answerable in order for the game to be playable.) I said that a scientist must confront the possibility of giving up the norms of a domain; indeed, she has a responsibility to do so. "Refusing to accept" intransigent impossibilities has a double meaning. One way of refusing to accept is bullheadedly refusing even to see-blinding oneself.
xistentially, that kind of refusal-running away and hiding-is irresponsible.
e responsibility here ows from her ontological understanding not only of the "game" of science but also of herself as a "player" of that game-as a scientist-and so as bound by its norms through a commitment she has both to herself as a player and to the game itself. As such, what matters from the perspective of ontological understanding is not simply that discovered phenomena not be impossible but also that she can coherently ful ll her responsibility as a player. e sort of responsibility at issue here is for the playability-the viability-of the "game" of science itself, what Haugeland calls "ontological truth". us, we might say, in contrast to ontical truth, which is that which determines success in our discoveries of how things in fact are, ontological truth is that which determines the success of an ontological understanding in making sense of the being of phenomena as the phenomena they are. e commitment to . Haugeland's model here, of course, is omas S. Kuhn, e tructure of cienti c evolutions (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, )-the gospel according to "Saint omas A-Kuhn-is", as we sometimes teased him.
. Especially "esoteric chess": chess played in a medium in which it is initially very di cult for the uninitiated to be able to identify the pieces and positions, let alone manipulate those pieces to make a move. ( e initiated, a er considerable training, are able to do this e ortlessly, much like experienced musicians have the ability easily to recognize certain patterns of sound as particular chords or chord progressions and so can manipulate the sounds so as to continue those patterns.) For details, see Haugeland, "Truth and Rule Following, " § .
. Haugeland, "Truth and Finitude, " -. . Ibid., .
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REEXAMINING EXISTENTIAL COMMITMENT
and resulting responsibility for ontological truth, Haugeland says, are existential. It should be clear that in undertaking this existential commitment to ontological truth we are beholden to the very entities whose discovery that commitment makes possible, for it is in the face of the apparent discovery of impossible phenomena whose appearance cannot be explained away that we confront ontological falsity: the failure of the norms to constitute a "playable game". Indeed, this explains the sense in which entities are autonomous: they are "independent" of those norms "in the concrete and inescapable sense that they are out of control". Because such norms are beholden to autonomous entities, those norms are not simply arbitrary; rather they are a kind of achievement and the entities whose discovery they make possible are objective.
is is what Haugeland calls the beholdenness theory of truth.
Reexamining Existential Commitment
Haugeland understands of the objectivity of entities in terms of their being criterial not only for correct recognition (their authority) but also for the constitutive norms of the domain (their autonomy); hence objective phenomena are discoverable and their intelligibility can be an achievement. It is not clear to me, however, that Haugeland has yet captured another aspect of our ordinary notion of objectivity, namely the publicness of objective phenomena: the idea that the objective world is one that we all (and not just particular individuals or even particular groups) share in common. I shall bring out the worry here in two ways. First, there is at least conceptual space for entities that are accessible, autonomous authorities that are nonetheless relative to particular individuals. Personal values-the sort of values that enter into a particular person's understanding of the sort of life worth living-are in e ect accessible, autonomous authorities that are relative in this way. For, as I have argued elsewhere, personal values are constituted by a certain sort of projectible, rational pattern in a particular person's emotions and evaluative judgments. On this account, values are accessible and authoritative in that they are that to which particular emotions are responsive, and they are autonomous in that the rational norms governing that pattern (as articulated in part by evaluative concepts) are answerable to those values themselves; nonetheless, such values as personal are relative to the individual. Whether or not this account is successful, the possibility of such an account ought to make us worry about whether an understanding of objectivity in terms of accessible, autonomous authorities is su cient.
Second, in part in light of the analogy Haugeland makes to games, we might worry about the possibility of "forking the game. " Imagine that Alice and Bob have been happily playing chess (perhaps even esoteric chess-see note ) until Alice makes a particular move to which Bob objects, saying that bishops can't move like that. Alice replies that the bishop had turned Dra : Do not cite or circulate without permission! -June , into a knight two moves back when it was surrounded by a certain con guration of pieces, in much the same way that pawns can turn into other pieces once they reach the last row. Both Alice and Bob are stubborn, and both have their followers, resulting in a group of people that decide to play chess Alice's way, and another group Bob's way. In such a case, it might seem, there is no clear sense in which one of them is right and the other wrong: the game has forked in two. Indeed, this is what o en happens with games like razy ights or onopoly, in which there are many variations or "house rules" delineating what are in e ect di erent (albeit related) games. What has gone wrong from the perspective of public objectivity is that there is no pressure for Alice and Bob (and their followers) to play the same game: the public objectivity of chess entities would seem to require that chess players ought to agree on the same constitutive norms, and yet it is just not clear either that this is true in the case of chess or that Haugeland has a way of making sense of such shared normativity in domains in which it matters, such as science. is last claim becomes especially worrisome when we look carefully at how Haugeland articulates the sort of existential commitment and existential responsibility at the root of his account of the autonomy of entities. As partially quoted in the epigraph, Haugeland claims that an existential commitment to ontological truth is: a dedicated or even a devoted way of living: a determination to maintain and carry on. It is not a communal status at all but a resilient and resolute rstpersonal stance. . . . [I] t is a way, a style, a mode of playing, working, or living-a way that relies and is prepared to insist on that which is constitutive of its own possibility, the conditions of its intelligibility. . . . e governing or normative 'authority' of an existential commitment comes from nowhere other than itself, and it is brought to bear in no way other than by its own exercise-that is, by self-discipline and resolute persistence. A committed individual holds him or herself to the commitment by living in a resilient, determined way.
Note that for Haugeland it is individuals that undertake and hold themselves to existential commitments through self -discipline.
is emphasis on individuals is even more emphatic in remarks he makes about responsibility. In de ning responsibility in general, Haugeland says, "a responsiveness that nds what is ruled out in the responding entity's own actions to be unacceptable to that entity itself is responsibility. " And he says that existential responsibility (or 'conscience') in particular is a more originary self -responsibility-one that cannot be public but can only be taken over by an individual. Conscience, understood existentially, calls upon Dasein in each case to take over and own this responsibility.
. Haugeland, "Truth and Rule Following, " . . It should be acknowledged that Haugeland describes existential commitment as essentially rst-personal, saying "the rst person doesn't mean particularly the rst-person singular" (ibid., , his emphasis). Yet he nowhere spells this out, and (as I point out in the text just below) in later work is more explicit in understanding existential commitment and responsibility as individual matters.
. Haugeland, "Truth and Finitude, " , his emphasis. . Ibid., , his emphasis. Note that for Haugeland, " 'Dasein in each case' means each individual person,
REEXAMINING EXISTENTIAL COMMITMENT
It is not entirely clear what Haugeland means here. At a minimum it seems he must mean that a particular person's taking responsibility for how she understands the world is conceptually prior to others holding her responsible. It is precisely this claim that I think is a mistake: being able to take responsibility, I claim, is not intelligible apart from one's being a part of a community in which others can hold one responsible, so that self-responsibility is not "more originary". If existential commitment and existential responsibility are fundamentally individual matters, then it might seem that there is no pressure for di erent "players" to play the same "game". It would not be we scientists (or chess players or musicians, etc.) who jointly bear responsibility for upholding a common way of life that discloses a domain of entities. With what right, then, can you criticize me for too quickly changing my understanding of the laws of nature in order to resolve apparently anomalous experimental results? Even if your existential commitment is to an understanding of norms according to which my acceptance of the anomaly is rash and irresponsible, if existential commitment and responsibility are individual then there is no reason to think I am or ought to be committed in the same way and so no reason to think that either I or you are failing in our individual existential responsibilities. My refusal to accept your criticism is, in e ect, a matter of my forking the "game" of science and thereby responding to di erent entities than you are, so that we in a sense inhabit di erent "science worlds", in much the same way we could fork the game of chess and so inhabit di erent chess worlds. at is not the sort of shared, public objectivity we need for science or that Haugeland is trying to make intelligible.
Of course, we might assume that what makes intelligible such public objectivity is the world itself: given that there is a single world to which we scientists are all individually committed and beholden, we can expect there to be a convergence in our individual ontological understandings of that common world. However, it is not clear in advance that there is a single best way to understand the world and so that our individual understandings will converge; that this is so is part of the existential commitment we scientists undertake as scientists. As the example of personal values shows, not all phenomena need be publicly accessible in the sense of being an aspect of the world that everyone ought to recognize on pain of criticism from others: not everyone need share my personal value of doing philosophy, and those who also happen to value doing philosophy need not change their value (or criticize me or be subject to criticism themselves) when I do. What is needed for existential commitment to public objectivity is that we be answerable to each other: I cannot escape your criticism simply by claiming to inhabit a di erent "science world" than you do. Rather, for your criticism to be genuine, the con ict between us must be one that can be resolved by appeal to a single shared authority as that to which we are beholden together. Consequently, the existential commitment to a public, objective, scienti c world must be one we undertake jointly so that whether or not one accepts my controversial suggestion that Dasein as such is not individual or personal" (Haugeland, "Truth and Finitude, " ). See also John Haugeland, "Closing the Last Loophole: Joining Forces with Vincent Descombes, " nquiry ( ): -. . Although I shall have something to say about this claim below in § , I have argued for it in more detail in Bennett W. Helm, "Accountability and Some Social Dimensions of Human Agency, " hilosophical ssues ( ).
we are responsible not only to that shared world but also to each other. And this means that my existential commitment and responsibility to a shared, public world requires not merely that I be able to take responsibility for my understanding but also that you be able to hold me responsible for it. Existential commitment and responsibility cannot therefore be individual matters, contrary to Haugeland's claim, on pain of abandoning the sort of objectivity we thought the world has. is all raises the question of how we should make sense of existential commitment and responsibility in such a way as to make intelligible how they can be ours jointly. Haugeland never clearly addresses what such commitment and responsibility are, even in the individual case, let alone the joint case. My aim in the remainder of this paper is to explain this. In doing so, I shall follow Haugeland's (and Heidegger's) lead in thinking of existential commitment as involving a distinctive kind of caring. I shall rst, in § , brie y and without argument, outline my background account of caring in terms of the emotions. ere are many di erent types of caring, including valuing, loving, and respecting, each distinguished by a distinct class of emotions. e account in § will be of a basic type of caring that we share with the animals, and I shall proceed in § to lay out an account of respect in terms of a distinctive rational pattern of reactive attitudes-emotions like resentment, gratitude, indignation, approbation, and trust. In part (and partly following Strawson and Darwall ) , my claim will be that we respect others as members of particular communities of respect, and that it is within such communities of respect that we hold each other responsible and so can take responsibility for the joint commitments that de ne that community. In § , I shall argue that when public objectivity is in play, our existential commitments can best be understood in terms of our forming a community of respect committed to truth, thereby lling in the gaps in Haugeland's account of objectivity.
Caring and the Emotions
In general, to care about something is to have a concern for its well-being, a concern in which one nds it to be worthy of both one's attention and action. As I have long argued, caring is constituted by rational patterns of emotions. To understand this, it is rst necessary to say something about the emotions and their objects.
Emotions in general involve implicit evaluations, with each type of emotion having its own characteristic evaluation-its own formal object; the object one evaluates in having a particular emotion is that emotion's target. For example, I might be afraid that the kids playing baseball in the street will damage my car, or I might be angry at you for stealing my car. In these cases, the kids and you are the targets of my fear and anger, and in having these emotions, I am evaluating them as dangerous (the formal object of fear) or you as o ensive (the formal 
CARING AND THE EMOTIONS
object of anger). One question these evaluations raise is why they are appropriate. Here the answer cannot simply be that the kids have the potential to damage my car, for they also have the potential to damage the piece of cardboard they are using for home plate, and yet that fact wouldn't normally inspire my fear. e di erence is that I just don't care about that piece of cardboard, whereas I do care about my car: it is only because of the relationship between their playing and something I care about (namely my car) that my emotional evaluation of them as dangerous makes sense. We can formalize this idea by understanding emotions to have a third object in addition to a target and a formal object: an emotion's focus is the background object the subject cares about whose relation to the target makes intelligible the evaluation of the target in terms of the formal object. So both my fear of the kids and my anger at you have my car as their focus.
is notion of an emotion's focus is important for understanding the way emotions are rationally connected to each other. For the sense in which each emotion "involves" an evaluation should be understood in terms of a commitment to the worth-to the import-of the focus of that emotion and thereby of its target. is means that in having one emotion and so being committed to the import of its focus, one is thereby committed to having other emotions with the same focus in the appropriate circumstances: committed in the sense that, other things being equal, one rationally ought to have such emotions. For example, there would be something rationally odd about my being afraid of the kids and yet not also being relieved were my car to escape unscathed; this indicates that in feeling particular emotions we undertake what I have called transitional commitments from forward-looking emotions (like hope and fear) to corresponding backward-looking emotions (like relief and disappointment). Similarly, there would be something rationally odd about my being relieved that my car avoided the danger if, in the relevant counterfactual situation in which my car's windshield is broken, I would not also feel saddened or angry; this indicates that in feeling particular emotions we undertake tonal commitments between positive emotions (like relief and satisfaction) and negative emotions (like sadness and anger). Moreover, these rational connections among emotions apply even when the emotions do not share a common target: my fear of the kids is rationally connected to my fear of the impending hailstorm and my anger at you for stealing my car. (How do you suppose I would-should-feel were I to discover that sometime during the night a large tree branch fell on my car?)
Because a condition of the intelligibility of one's having any particular mental capacity is that one is by and large rational in the exercises of that capacity, one's emotions must in general come in projectible patterns with a common focus. Other things being equal, isolated emotions not falling within such patterns manifest emotional irrationality because they thereby fail in their commitments to other emotions; conversely, once a pattern of emotions is established, one generally ought to have other emotions with the relevant focus when these are otherwise appropriate. To exhibit such a pattern of emotions is therefore to be disposed to attend to the focus of that pattern and to act on its behalf; moreover, the rationality of the pattern is such that one ought so to attend and act. Consequently, I claim, because caring about something-its having import to you-is a matter of nding it worthy . See, e.g., Donald Davidson, ssays on ctions and vents (New York, NY: Clarendon Press, ).
Dra : Do not cite or circulate without permission! -June , of your attention and action, we can see that what it is to care about something-what it is for that to have import to you-just is for it to be the focus of such a projectible, rational pattern of emotions. Particular emotions, then, can be assessed for warrant depending in part on whether they t into such a pattern of emotions with a common focus-on whether they are properly responsive to what has import to one. In my discussion so far, 'import' is intended to be a generic term for the worth something has to one. Clearly there are many distinct ways in which something can have import. In earlier work I have distinguished caring from valuing: whereas caring is a kind of evaluative attitude we share with at least some higher animals like dogs and cats, valuing is deeper in that it involves nding something worthwhile as a part of an overall life worth living. Consequently, the emotions constituting values must be similarly "deep" in their characteristic evaluations.
ese emotions, such as pride, shame, and anxiety, I call person-focused emotions to re ect their engagement with the quality of life of particular persons. To value something, then, is for it to be the focus of a projectible, rational pattern of person-focused emotions. In general, distinctive kinds of import are constituted by distinctive classes of emotions, classes de ned by the way in which such emotions form rational patterns with common focuses. As I have recently begun to argue and will summarize in § , we can make intelligible a further evaluative attitude, respect, in terms of another distinctive class of emotions, namely the reactive attitudes. is will prove fundamental to understanding Haugeland's notion of an existential commitment.
Respect and the Reactive Attitudes
According to Strawson, the "participant reactive attitudes are essentially natural human reactions to the good or ill will or indi erence of [people towards each other], as displayed in their attitudes and actions". Strawson distinguishes three types of reactive attitudes: the personal reactive attitudes (such as resentment and gratitude), the vicarious reactive attitudes (such as indignation and approbation), and the self reactive attitudes (such as guilt and self-approbation). As I shall suggest, that there are these three types of reactive attitudes is fundamentally important.
ere has been some controversy about exactly which emotions we should classify as reactive attitudes. Strawson himself was rather liberal, including such responses as esteem, . is is, of course, an oversimpli cation, for desires and evaluative judgments can also be a part of the relevant patterns constituting import; indeed, that this is so is partially constitutive of them as desires and evaluative judgments. For details, see Helm, motional eason.
. I argue for this claim in more detail in Bennett W. Helm, ove, riendship, and the elf: ntimacy, dentication, and the ocial ature of ersons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ). . Bennett W. Helm, "Responsibility and Dignity: Strawsonian emes, " in orality and the motions, ed. Carla Bagnoli (Oxford University Press, ), -; Helm, "Accountability and Some Social Dimensions of Human Agency. "
. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment, " . e passage from which this quote was taken was intended to describe only the personal reactive attitudes; I have somewhat generalized it to include the vicarious and self reactive attitudes as well.
Dra : Do not cite or circulate without permission! -June , indi erence, contempt, love, loss of security, goodwill, a ection, and forgiveness. Others, such as Jay Wallace, are much more restrictive, limiting the reactive attitudes to just a few negative emotions: resentment, indignation, and guilt. As indicated at the end of § , I think this controversy can be settled, and so the class of reactive attitudes can be delineated, by looking to the kind of rational patterns the reactive attitudes form with a common focus, thereby constituting a distinctive kind of import. Such rational patterns will involve various rational commitments among the reactive attitudes.
Consider rst a tonal commitment: if I resent you for harming me in some way, then I ought also feel gratitude towards you in other circumstances were you notably to bene t me. If this is right, then we should not, contra Wallace, restrict the reactive attitudes to simply negative emotions. Yet what is interesting about the reactive attitudes is that the relevant rational commitments are not simply intrapersonal; they are interpersonal as well: one person's reactive attitudes are rationally tied to those of others, addressing them and calling on them for a response.
us, if you resent me for harming you in some way, then other things being equal I ought to feel guilty and others ought to feel disapprobation or indignation.
e rational connections here are among the personal reactive attitudes of the "victim", the self reactive attitudes of the "perpetrator", and the vicarious reactive attitudes of witnesses. In each case, there would be something rationally amiss about your feeling resentment and yet my not feeling guilt or their not feeling disapprobation: either you are responding in a case in which I haven't really wronged you, or I'm failing to take responsibility for what I did, or others are failing to hold me responsible. In each case, the failure is a failure to respond as we ought.
What about transitional commitments? If the reactive attitudes form the sort of rational patterns I have claimed are constitutive of caring, then we ought to nd transitional commitments between forward-looking and backward-looking reactive attitudes. Yet here it might seem that my attempt to understand the class of reactive attitudes in terms of the rational patterns they form constituting a distinctive kind of caring breaks down: what is distinctive of the reactive attitudes as reactive, it might seem, is that they are responses to what has already happened-that they are essentially backwards-looking emotions. In reply, we do nd transitional commitments between trust and distrust and the reactive attitudes: other things being equal, if you uphold my trust, I ought to feel gratitude (and you ought to feel self-approbation), whereas if you betray my trust, I ought to feel resentment (and you ought to feel guilty).
is indicates that we should construe the reactivity of reactive attitudes not as being to what is done to us or others but rather as being to persons as proper objects of Dra : Do not cite or circulate without permission! -June , our address-as having a certain standing or status as victims, perpetrators, or witnesses. A er all, inanimate objects and non-human agents are not appropriate targets of reactive attitudes precisely because they do not have the requisite standing; and the di erence between reactive attitudes like resentment and their non-reactive analogs like anger seems to involve the perpetrator's failing properly to acknowledge or respond to that standing. If this is right, then trust and distrust (as distinct from their non-reactive analogs like reliance) would seem to be reactive attitudes insofar as they exhibit precisely this sort of reactivity to the standing others (or we ourselves) have.
e upshot is that the reactive attitudes are a distinctive class of emotions de ned by the distinctively interpersonal rational patterns that they form. is leads to two questions: (a) what is the common focus of such patterns to the import of which we are committed in feeling the reactive attitudes, and (b) what is the distinctive form of caring these rational patterns constitute?
It might seem as though the focus of reactive attitudes would be particular people. As Strawson says, the reactive attitudes are responses to the good or ill will one person shows another. In particular, it may seem that my nding you worthy of resentment or gratitude is made intelligible in part by a background concern for my standing as a group member. Indeed, in feeling resentment the victim is addressing the perpetrator, calling on her and others, through the self and vicarious reactive attitudes, to recognize this standing that he, the victim, has, and they ought to respond with such reactive attitudes precisely because of the kind of authority that standing has. So it may seem that the focus of these reactive attitudes is the victim or the victim's standing. However, it should be clear that such a concern for standing cuts multiple ways. For, rst, that very standing just is the standing of the victim's being a responsible agent accountable to others and so potentially the object of their resentment in relevantly similar circumstances-a resentment which in turn manifests their concern for their own standing. Moreover, second, the victim's resentment of the perpetrator equally manifests a concern for the standing of the perpetrator, for if the victim were not thereby to recognize her standing in the community, his reaction would not be intelligible as resentment rather than the non-reactive analog of anger. Finally, the victim's resentment equally manifests a concern for the standing of witnesses by calling on them to feel disapprobation towards the perpetrator, a call which is rationally connected to the victim's further resentment directed at them when they do not. Consequently, we cannot disconnect the concern for the standing of one member of the community from the concern we have for others' standings.
All of this might suggest that the focus of the reactive attitudes is not individual persons but particular norms, the violation (or notable upholding) of which grounds particular reactive attitudes. However, once again we nd that the commitment to a particular norm is rationally tied to the commitment to other norms de ning the community. us, assume we're playing basketball on the same team. It is, other things being equal, rationally inappropriate for you . For an extended discussion of reactive attitudes as responsive to the standing others have as persons, see Darwall, e econd-erson tandpoint.
. Strawson partially recognizes this point in his discussion of the "human connection" among the reactive attitudes: Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment, " .
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to resent me for consistently failing to pass to you when you are open in scoring position and yet fail to feel disapprobation for my constantly arguing with the referee. is is because the concern I have for each norm is subsidiary to the concern I have for the practice we have of playing basketball and so, ultimately, to the norm of being a good sport and thereby of properly recognizing the standing each has as a player. All of this suggests that the focus of the reactive attitudes is the community itself and its de ning activities, practices, or way of life. e caring commitment each member of that community has to its members (including to herself) and to the norms de ning that community are intelligible only as constituents of the commitment to the community itself in something like the way the caring commitment to the means is a constituent of the commitment to the end and is not intelligible apart from it. For it is only the commitment to the import of the community that can explain these rational interconnections and so the way in which the standing of each member can have import in this way. Consequently, following my analysis of caring about the means as a part of caring about the end, I shall say that the community is the focus of the reactive attitudes, and the individual members of the community-the victim, the perpetrator, and the witnesses-as well as the relevant norms are their sub-focuses with their corresponding subpatterns. us, my resentment of you ts not only into the pattern of reactive attitudes constituting the import of the community itself but also into the subpatterns of reactive attitudes subfocused on you (as the perpetrator), on me (as the victim), on others (as witnesses), and on the norm you violated.
Given this, what can we say about the form of caring such patterns of reactive attitudes constitute? As I have suggested, to feel particular reactive attitudes is to hold others responsible (or yourself take responsibility) as a part of recognizing the import of their (or your) standing as a member of the community. Indeed, such standing just is one's standing as a responsible agent accountable to others in the community, and to have a concern for such standing just is to respect the person. Such respect is what Darwall calls recognition respect, a matter of recognizing the standing others have, as opposed to what he calls appraisal respect, which is "an assessment of someone's conduct or character" in light of the norms of the community-an assessment that itself is a particular reactive attitude. Consequently we might understand members' concern for the community to itself to be reverence, so that they respect each other as a part of revering the community and its way of life. Such communities, therefore, we might call communities of respect.
Two facets of this account need to be brought out. First, I have understood the patterns of reactive attitudes to be essentially interpersonal: my gratitude for you is rationally connected . See Helm, motional eason, especially Chapter , and, for its application to making sense of how in love we value what our beloved values as a part of loving him, see Helm, ove, riendship, and the elf , especially Chapters -.
. Implicit in this account is the idea that we can belong to many di erent, potentially overlapping communities. is runs counter to the presumption found in the literature that the reactive attitudes involve a single, "human" community-the community of all persons.
. See Darwall, e econd-erson tandpoint, ; Darwall does not understand this distinction in terms of my distinction between particular emotions and the evaluative attitudes constituted by patterns of emotions (but he should: failing to do so leads him to question whether this distinction can ultimately be maintained (see ibid., n )).
REVERENCE FOR ONTOLOGICAL TRUTH
to your self-approbation and others' (appraisal) respect. Such interpersonal structure to these patterns implies that the underlying commitment to the import of the community and its members and norms is not the commitment of the members individually but is rather theirs jointly: it is we who respect each other as a part of our reverence for the community as a community of respect. Consequently, my respecting other members is something I do-indeed, ought to do-only as one of us. Second, the standing one has as a member of the community and to which each ought to respond with the reactive attitudes in the appropriate circumstances is the standing as a responsible agent, able not only to take responsibility for what one does but also with the authority to hold others responsible to the norms of the community. Insofar as the community as a community of respect, in which each has this standing the others ought to recognize, is itself constituted in substantial part by these interpersonal rational patterns of reactive attitudes, we can see that our being responsible agents at all depends on our having such standing within a community of respect and so is not intelligible apart from others' standing to hold us responsible: neither taking responsibility nor holding responsible is "more originary" than the other, contrary to Haugeland's assumption (see note ). Responsibility, therefore, is essentially social.
Reverence for Ontological Truth
We are now in a position to return to the questions raised at the end of § concerning how we ought to understand Haugeland's notion of existential commitment in such a way as to make sense of the shared, public nature of objective truth. Recall that for Haugeland objects are accessible, autonomous authorities-are objective-only insofar as they that to which our thought and understanding is beholden as criteria of correctness that are independent both of particular thoughts and group consensus. Such independence is possible, Haugeland thinks, only if we can make sense of our ontological understanding-our understanding of what's possible and impossible for entities-as itself beholden to entities in virtue of our existential commitment to, and hence responsibility for, ontological truth. e trouble is, I argued, because he understands existential commitment (and the consequent responsibility) to be fundamentally an individual matter, Haugeland does not seem to be able to make sense of the publicness of objective phenomena: their being a part of a world to which we all are beholden and so that is in this sense shared in common by all. How, then, can we make sense of such commitment and responsibility in such a way as to make sense of publicness? As I suggested, public objectivity requires that the requisite existential commitment be something we undertake jointly. It should now be apparent how the account of communities of respect that I have been sketching can make sense of this: in order for public objectivity to be possible, we must form a community of respect in which we jointly revere ontical and ontological truth (perhaps among other things). Such joint reverence just is our existential commitment to ontical and ontological truth in which we each have standing to criticize the other and thereby to hold each (including oneself) responsible to the phenomena as a . Of course, I have not really argued for this here. For some detail, see Helm, "Accountability and Some Social Dimensions of Human Agency. " Dra : Do not cite or circulate without permission! -June , common authority for their "moves" in this "game" of "giving and asking for reasons" for how things objectively are-of "justifying and being able to justify what one says. " is standing to criticize and so to hold each other responsible means that disagreements among us will in general be genuine and not merely verbal, grounded in a shared ontological understanding of the world. Because we are each answerable to the others from within a community that jointly reveres ontological truth, we cannot simply escape criticism by "forking" our ontology; rather, we are jointly beholden to a shared, public world. is needs further explanation.
In a game like basketball, a player might commit a foul, in a sense "breaking the rules", and so be penalized for it-turning the ball over to the other team, for example. Such sanctions are ways of holding players accountable to the rules, and yet it is important to note two things about them. First, they are not sanctions imposed from outside the game itself as a way of ensuring that players remain in the game; rather, they are themselves part of the rules, and other things being equal, in committing fouls, whether intentionally or not, players are playing the game of basketball just as much as when they do not. Second, such sanctions are intelligible as sanctions-as ways of holding players accountable-and not merely as an arbitrary harm sometimes imposed on some players only because they are embedded within the relevant patterns of reactive attitudes. Although we do not feel resentment or disapprobation for players who commit fouls-indeed, sometimes we may (appraisal) respect a player for her ability to commit smart fouls-we do feel these reactive attitudes when players temporarily fail in their reverence for the game itself in part by failing in their respect for other players.
us, a player who refuses to accept the referee's call thereby manifests a lack of respect for the referee and her standing as such in a way that, we might think, merits the resentment or disapprobation of other players. (Of course, the referee herself might abuse her standing and authority in intentionally calling the game unfairly, and so she, rather than the player refusing to accept her call, might be the proper object of resentment and disapprobation.) It is in feeling these reactive attitudes that we hold players (including the referee) accountable to the norms de ning the practice of basketball and so call upon each properly to respect the others as players.
e same is true in the "game" of giving and asking for reasons-the game de ned by our joint reverence for objective, public truth. Claims I make about what is true are not simply claims about how things are for me; that would not be a "move" in this "game". Rather, they are about how things are period, and so are claims about how others should see the world, too. Of course, such a claim can be based on false or inadequate evidence or on bad reasoning, and so I might thereby fail to uphold the "rules"-the norms-of this game in a way that is something like the commission of a foul in basketball, and someone might call me to account for such a failure by o ering a criticism or asking for a justi cation. Such criticism or demand for justi cation is intelligible as a way of holding someone accountable only because it involves one's having the standing to criticize, a standing that others in general ought to respect.
. Robert Brandom, aking t xplicit: easoning, epresenting, and iscursive ommitment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, ). . Wilfrid Sellars, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, " in cience, erception, and eality, ed. Wilfrid Sellars (London: Routledge / Kegan Paul, ), § ; see also Brandom, aking t xplicit.
Dra : Do not cite or circulate without permission! -June , Once again, although we do not feel resentment or disapprobation towards those who make mistaken assertions, we do when they fail properly to respect others. us, other things being equal, to fail properly to acknowledge and respond to criticism or a demand for justi cation is to fail properly to respect the other's standing to criticize in virtue of which each is answerable to the others; it is such failures to respect others (or notable manifestations of such respect) that merit the reactive attitudes. For example, we might feel resentment or disapprobation towards a psychologist who, in videotaping subjects in the experimental condition and then intentionally scores (and puts pressure on his graduate students to score) these videos in such a way as to con rm his hypothesis, for he thereby outs the norms of science and betrays the trust others have placed in him; or someone might feel gratitude towards an adviser who trusted and supported her in pursuit of an unpopular research program that eventually bears fruit. Of course, other things aren't always equal. ose who criticize me may be prejudiced or in other ways blind to the truth, or they may have ulterior motives leading them to distort the truth, or they may lack the necessary expertise, so that their criticisms utterly miss the mark. In such cases, attending to and responding to criticism may be otiose. Yet I must still have reasons to think this, reasons grounded not just in my understanding of others as responsible to a shared, objective world but also my understanding of how particular others are responsible: I must appraise their responsibility, at least within a particular domain of truth, and so have reason, for example, to trust or distrust them. Moreover, I must similarly have such an understanding of myself, as having this standing as a responsible epistemic agent, both beholden to the shared world and accountable to others. Yet such appraisals of oneself or others are themselves criticizable, reasons for them can be questioned or demanded, and I can be praised or blamed for how I handle the criticism and reasons of others. Consequently, in having a caring commitment to objective, shared truth, I must care about and be responsible (and so beholden to the world) for not only the judgments and understanding I have of the world but also how I respond to others in taking or failing to take their criticisms seriously. In thus blaming others for epistemic irresponsibility, we call on them to accept such blame or account for themselves, thereby taking responsibility for objective truth.
Consider how this plays out not simply in the case of our ontical understanding (as has featured in my examples thus far) but also in the case of ontological understanding. Assume that a er doing a single experiment a rmly established physicist calls a press conference celebrating his discovery of a new elementary particle or fundamental force and so a change in our ontological understanding of the world. Here it may seem that this physicist is being irresponsible: attempting to change the game, to reject his "ontological heritage", in the face of evidence that is too scanty, so that he is at best being sloppy. In the face of such criticism, it is not an option for the physicist simply to fork the ontology and thereby escape that criticism by claiming to inhabit a di erent "world". For to do so would be to fail properly to respect the standing others have to criticize him, demand justi cation, and so hold him accountable, in part through the reactive attitudes. Consequently, as a member of a community of respect that reveres objective, public truth, in choosing to reject his ontological heritage he is making . Haugeland, "Truth and Finitude, " . Dra : Do not cite or circulate without permission! -June , REVERENCE FOR ONTOLOGICAL TRUTH not simply a personal choice, as when he nds the life worth pursuing for him to involve science rather than music or to involve his having children rather than not. Rather, in so choosing he is, more or less responsibly, taking a stand on what is right for others, thereby leaving himself open to precisely this sort of criticism as a part of the community of respect that reveres ontological truth.
All of this implies that in being committed to objective, public truth, each must have a certain understanding of herself as responsible to a shared world, with shared standards regulating her ontological understanding, and so as accountable and answerable to others, including herself. In short, making sense of the autonomous authority of publicly objective phenomena requires understanding Haugeland's notion of an existential commitment in terms of communities of respect in which our responsibility to the world essentially involves our accountability to each other via the reactive attitudes.
It should be apparent that a very large objection is looming. I have claimed that one cannot escape criticism by forking the ontology because one's membership in a community of respect makes one be answerable to others who can hold one responsible to the objective world. However, why can't someone fork the ontology and so escape this sort of accountability to others simply by opting out of the group? An initial reply might go like this: membership in the group, in the rst instance, is determined by the actual patterns of reactive attitudes. So someone is a member of this group just in case we generally hold him responsible to the norms of the group: you are accountable to us just in case we actually hold you to account and so accord you the standing as a member. Yet this initial reply is inadequate: surely the group can be wrong about its membership: prejudice of various sorts can prevent us (white men, say) from recognizing that others (women, various minorities) really are members of this community of respect and so treating them accordingly, but such treatment is wrong. So the question, of who should be treated as a member of the community of respect that reveres objective truth, so far seems to have no answer. Even worse, there seems to be no compelling reason to think that there will be a single such community: someone who wanted to fork our ontology (rather than convince the rest of us that we misunderstand the world) may accept my claim that objective truth and so existential responsibility can be made intelligible only in terms of communities of respect and so form a distinct community with its own ontology, claiming that objective truth, while public, is nonetheless relative to a community. Consequently, the account of objective truth I have been recommending seems to fall short of what we were looking for.
I have no convincing answer to this objection. It may be that we have to bite the bullet and accept that objective, public truth is relative to a community; perhaps it will turn out that this bullet is not so hard to bite. Yet even so we still need an account of group membership such that the group itself can be mistaken, and it may be that such an account will relieve, if not overcome, worries about relativity. Here, I believe, we can appeal to the community's joint ontical and ontological understanding of itself and its members-an understanding the community ought to consider insofar as the community and its members will be among the truths such a community, as revering objective truth, is concerned with. In particular, members of the community of respect revering objective truth, I claim, are properly understood to be persons, CONCLUSION so that our ontological understanding of what it is to be a person as well as our ontical understanding of who in fact is a person themselves must be beholden to the phenomena and so open to both potential dispute and potential resolution. Indeed, (dare I say it?) this sounds like what Heidegger is a er with the existential analytic of Dasein.
Conclusion
I began with the question John asked at my dissertation defense: how is belief richer than a mere informational state? Now, almost years later, I think I have the beginnings of an answer. As Searle makes clear, to believe something in the rich sense distinctive of persons is not merely a matter of "holding something true": ink hard for one minute about what would be necessary to establish that that hunk of metal on the wall over there had real beliefs, beliefs with direction of t, propositional content, and conditions of satisfaction; beliefs that had the possibility of being strong beliefs or weak beliefs; nervous, anxious, or secure beliefs; dogmatic, rational, or superstitious beliefs; blind faiths or hesitant cogitations; any kind of beliefs. e thermostat is not a candidate.
at beliefs can be strong, nervous, dogmatic, hesitant, etc., and that these possibilities for belief are essential to the rich sense of belief characteristic of persons, make sense given a background of caring that is simultaneously a matter of caring about-revering-objective truth and, as a part of such reverence, caring about-respecting-oneself and others as responsible epistemic agents. In short, to believe something is to hold it true in such a way that one cares about its truth, as a part of revering objective truth from within a community of respect. Moreover, the capacity for belief in this rich sense is intelligible only as a part of a more general account of persons as fundamentally caring, social creatures. I can think of no better tribute to John than to continue to pursue this line of thought.
. John R. Searle, "Minds, Brains, and Programs, " ehavioral and rain ciences ( ): .
